Introduction to Firewalls

Today’s Topics:

- Types of firewalls
  - Packet Filtering Firewalls
  - Application Level Firewalls
  - Firewall Hardware/Software
  - IPChains/IPFilter/Cisco Router ACLs

- Firewall Security
  - Enumeration
  - Identification
  - Attacking/Evading
  - Example Rule sets
  - Bypassing
Types of firewalls

- Packet Filtering firewall
  - Operate on transport and network layers of the TCP/IP stack

- Application Gateways/Proxies
  - Operate on the application protocol level
Packet Filtering Firewall

- Operate on transport and network layers of the TCP/IP stack
- Decides what to do with a packet depending upon the following criteria:
  - Transport protocol (TCP, UDP, ICMP),
  - Source and destination IP address
  - The source and destination ports
  - ICMP message type/code
  - Various TCP options such as packet size, fragmentation etc.
Packet Filtering Firewall: Terminology

• Stateless Firewall: The firewall makes a decision on a packet by packet basis.

• Stateful Firewall : The firewall keeps state information about transactions (connections).

• NAT - Network Address translation
  – Translates public IP address(es) to private IP address(es) on a private LAN.
Packet Filtering Firewall: Functions

- Forward the packet(s) on to the intended destination
- Reject the packet(s) and notify the sender (ICMP dest unreach/admin prohibited)
- Drop the packet(s) without notifying the sender.
- Log accepted and/or denied packet information
- NAT - Network Address Translation
Packet Filtering Firewall: Disadvantages

• Filters can be difficult to configure. It’s not always easy to anticipate traffic patterns and create filtering rules to fit.
• Filter rules are sometimes difficult to test
• Packet filtering can degrade router performance
• Attackers can “tunnel” malicious traffic through allowed ports on the filter.
Application Gateway (Proxy Server)

- Operate at the application protocol level. (Telnet, FTP, HTTP)

- Application Gateways “Understand” the protocol and can be configured to allow or deny specific protocol operations.

- Typically, proxy servers sit between the client and actual service. Both the client and server talk to the proxy rather than directly with each other.
Application Gateway (Proxy Server): Disadvantages

• Requires modification to client software application
• Some client software applications don’t accommodate the use of a proxy
• Some protocols aren’t supported by proxy servers
• Some proxy servers may be difficult to configure and may not provide all the protection you need.
Firewall Hardware/Software

- Dedicated hardware/software application such as Cisco PIX Firewall which filters traffic passing through the multiple network interfaces.

- A Unix or Windows based host with multiple network interfaces, running a firewall software package which filters incoming and outgoing traffic across the interfaces.

- A Unix or Windows based host with a single network interface, running a firewall software package which filters the incoming and outgoing traffic to the individual interface.
Firewall Architecture

In the real world, designs are far more complex
Popular Free Packet Filtering Firewall software for Unix

- IPchains - Linux 2.2.x kernels

- IPTables (NetFilter) - Linux 2.4.x kernels
  - First stateful firewall package for Linux
  - http://netfilter.kernelnotes.org

- IPFilter - For Solaris, HP-UX, IRIX, *BSD
Popular Free Application Layer (Proxy) Firewalls.

- TIS FWTK - Firewall Toolkit
  - http://www.tis.com/research/software/fwtk_over.html
- SOCKS - Proxy Server
  - http://www.socks.nec.com
- Squid - HTTP, SSL, FTP proxy cache
Firewall Security

We are going to start with network firewall security and then cover proxy firewall security.

- Enumeration
- Identification
- Attacking/Evading
- Example Rule sets
- Bypassing
Firewall Enumeration

- First, we have to find the firewall
  - How about a port scan
    - Noisy
    - Won’t work in a well configured environment
  - Traceroute
    - Find out which system in the chain does not respond
Firewall Identification

- Identifying the firewall
  - Banner grabbing
    - Various firewalls run services with obvious banners
  - Fingerprinting
    - Firewalls may behave differently, given different stimuli
  - Port identification
    - Firewalls may run services
    - E.g. Old checkpoint FW-1 keeps 257/tcp open for SNMP
- Stateless vs. Stateful
Misconfiguration

- Liberal ACLs (a.k.a., firewall creep)
  - Problem:
    - Some organizations use a allow all, deny some rule set
  - Solution:
    - Use a deny all, allow some rule set
    - Policy
Stateless Packet Filters

- Source port scanning
  - Attack:
    - The attacker send port scans with a source port of an allowed service
    - E.g. Scan with a source port of 53/tcp (dns)
  - Countermeasure:
    - Use a properly configured stateful firewall
Stateless Packet Filters

- **Fragmentation Attacks**
  - Attack: Tiny fragmentation
    - IP and TCP headers are broken up across multiple fragmented packets
    - Large TCP packets may exhaust resources
  - Countermeasure:
    - Set a minimum packet size for fragmented packets (potential for DoS)
    - Packet reassembly (Watch out for pathological offsets though)
Stateful packet filters

- **Tunneling**
  - **Attack: Tunneling/Covert channels**
    - Encapsulate blocked traffic over allowed protocols (e.g. tunnel ssh over http or ICMP)
  
- **Countermeasure:**
  - Allow these types of traffic only to/from specific hosts
  - Disable ICMP through your firewall
  - Implement multiple layers of security
Firewalls

Note that Routers, Hosts, Bandwidth Managers and LoadBalancers can and have been used as network “Firewalls”.

Early Firewalls were of either of the two basic types, commercial Firewalls today are often hybrids:

1. Packet Filters – originally based on routers
   - Static (E.g. most routers)
   - Dynamic/Stateful/Multi-level (dedicated commercial firewalls and newer routers with firewall feature sets)

2. Proxies – originally based on dual-homed hosts
   - Application-aware Application Level Gateways (ALGs)
   - Generic, circuit or plug proxies (SOCKS, RWS, etc.)
   - Kernel proxies Transparent and “cut-thru” proxies

• New: Application level content filtering. Igear, Websweeper, MIMEsweeper, etc.
Add’l Adv. Firewall Functions

• Virus (malicious software) scanning.
• E-Mail attachment stripping/renaming.
• URL or (web) content blocking.
• Privacy protection (cookie & webbugs blocking)
• NAT & PAT (Network/Port Address Translation)
• Virtual Private Networking
• IDS/IDP inclusion with rule updates.
• Bandwidth Management, Flood/DoS Control.
• Load Balancing for scalability, redundancy and failover.
• Port Forwarding and virtual hosting.
Configuration: Router interfaces

interface GE-WAN6/5
    description ISP1 (vlan 5)
    bandwidth 1234567
    ip address 10.125.51.1 255.255.255.252
    ip access-group isp-campus-1-in in
    no ip proxy-arp
    ip route-cache flow

interface GigabitEthernet3/8
    description campus (vlan 4)
    ip address 10.125.52.1 255.255.255.252
    ip access-group campus-external-1-in in
    ip pim sparse-dense-mode
    ip route-cache flow
Ingress Filtering

- Filter incoming traffic to your network
- Disallow packets with rfc1918 source addresses
  - (e.g. 10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16)
- Disallow packets with local source addresses
- Disallow insecure services
  - Windows Networking
  - SNMP?
Configuration: Cisco Ingress ACL

ip access-list extended isp-campus-1-in
  deny ip 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
  deny ip 127.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
  deny ip 169.254.0.0 0.0.255.255 any
  deny ip 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255 any
  deny ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 any
  deny ip host 255.255.255.255 any log
  deny udp any local mask range 137 139
  deny tcp any local mask range 137 139
  deny udp any local mask eq 445
  deny tcp any local mask eq 445
  permit udp any local mask eq 135 log
  permit tcp any local mask eq 135 log
Egress Filtering

- Filter outgoing traffic from your network
- Disallow packets with rfc1918 source addresses
  - (e.g. 10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16)
- Disallow packets with non-local source addresses
  - This helps prevent IP Spoofing
- Disallow insecure services
  - Windows Networking
  - SNMP?
Configuration: Cisco Egress ACL

```
ip access-list extended campus-external-1-in
  deny udp local mask any range 137 139
  deny tcp local mask any range 137 139
  deny udp local mask any eq 135
  deny udp local mask any eq 1434
  permit tcp local mask any eq 27374 established
  deny tcp local mask any eq 27374
  permit ip local mask any
  deny ip any any log
```
Microsoft Networking

- Although a site specific decision, many sites choose to block Microsoft windows networking protocols at their border.

- NetBIOS/SMB is the ‘windows shares’ protocol
  - Frequent vector for virus infection
  - Too many non-password protected shares
  - VPN is a very good idea if you need NetBIOS
  - A LAN protocol, why should it traverse your border?

```
access-list XXX deny udp local mask any range 137 139
access-list XXX deny tcp local mask any range 137 139
access-list XXX deny udp local mask any range 445
access-list XXX deny tcp local mask any range 445
```
Microsoft Networking

• Although a site specific decision, many sites choose to block Microsoft windows networking protocols at their border.

• Windows Messenger is what generates those University Diploma popup windows
  – And they are becoming decidedly less savory…

  access-list XXX deny  udp local mask any eq 135

• University of Connecticut Windows Protocols List
  – http://security.uconn.edu/
Example: ipfilter ACL

# In rules
block in log body from any to any

pass in on hme0 proto tcp from any port = 80 to 10.1.1.2 port > 1024 with no ipopts keep state

pass in on hme0 proto tcp from any port = 443 to 10.1.1.2 port > 1024 with no ipopts keep state

pass in on hme0 proto tcp from 10.1.1.0/24 to 255.255.255.255
pass in on hme0 proto udp from 10.1.1.0/24 to 255.255.255.255

# Out rules
block out on hme0 log body from any to any
pass out on hme0 log proto icmp from 10.1.1.2 to 10.1.0.0/16
pass out on hme0 proto tcp from 10.1.1.2 port > 1024 to any port > 1024 with no ipopts keep state
Example: iptables ACL

```bash
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --sport 80 -d 10.1.1.2 --dport 1024: -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --sport 443 -d 10.1.1.2 --dport 1024: -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -s 10.1.1.0/24 -d 255.255.255.255 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p udp -s 10.1.1.0/24 -d 255.255.255.255 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -j DENY

iptables -A OUTPUT -p icmp -s 10.1.1.2 -d 10.1.0.0/16 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -s 10.1.1.2 -sport 1024: -dport 1024:
```
Tunneling: VPNs

- **Attack: Using a VPN for Tunneling**
  - Encapsulate traffic over a VPN connection
  - This is tough to catch as all the payload is encrypted

- **Countermeasure:**
  - Only allow VPN traffic to/from VPN concentrators
  - Implement multiple layers of security
Rule Enumeration

- Firewalking
  - Attack: Send IP packets destined for internal hosts with a small TTL
    - Analogous to traceroute, except using TCP and UDP packets.
    - If the firewall drops the packet, the port is closed
    - If you get a TTL exceeded, the port is open
  - Countermeasure:
    - Drop ICMP TTL exceeded messages at your border
    - Unfortunately, this may cause problems for legitimate users
IP Spoofing

- **Attack:** Spoof traffic from allowed hosts
  - Send packets with a spoofed source IP/port to bypass filters

- **Countermeasure:**
  - Egress filtering. Unfortunately, everyone needs to do this for it to be successful
SYN flooding

- **Attack:** Overwhelm the firewall’s stateful buffer hoping to evade
  - Send packets with a spoofed source IP/port to bypass filters

- **Countermeasure:**
  - Egress filtering. Unfortunately, everyone needs to do this for it to be successful
Dialup Hacking

- Why not physically bypass the firewall
  - Attack: Use war-dialing, etc. to find insecure dialup facilities
    - Potentially difficult to detect
    - Now you have an insider attack
  - Countermeasure: Secure all dialup facilities
    - Well, sounds good in theory
Insider Attacks

- Now you have a real problem
  - Problem:
    - Although firewalls filter traffic in both directions, they generally focus on incoming as opposed to outgoing
    - Generally ACLs are more permissive to hosts within the administrative domain
  - Solution:
    - Don’t let the attackers get in
    - Properly secure your firewall from the inside as well
Firewall Security Summary

- A well configured firewall is a critical piece of a security infrastructure
  - The key is “well configured”
  - Done correctly, a firewall will stop many of the most common attacks out there
- Some organizations don’t have them
  - E.g., Most major research institutions
- Just a piece of the puzzle
  - Layered defense is the real solution